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The history of foreclosure law is too often a story f well-meant attempts to protect debtors 
that generally turned out to do more harm than good. The common law provided for “strict 
foreclosure,” i.e., if a mortgagor failed to redeem, the property was turned over to the mortgagee 
directly, without a sale, to satisfy the debt. During the last century, legislatures became 
convinced that strict foreclosure was wrongly eliminat ng mortgagors’ equities in their 
properties. As a result, state legislatures replaced it with foreclosure by sale: the idea was that the 
property would sell at foreclosure for its full value and the mortgagor would get the surplus, 
which would save the mortgagor’s equity in the property. 
It didn’t turn out that way, however. Foreclosure sale  generally produced less than the full 
value of the properties sold. Mortgagors were more commonly becoming subject to deficiency 
judgments rather than the recipients of surpluses. (Under strict foreclosure, an attempt to get a 
money judgment if the property was not equal to the debt was basically impossible; deficiency 
judgments arose only with sale foreclosures.) 
Postsale Redemption 
The California legislative response to “underbidding” was to attempt to coerce bidders into 
bidding more by adopting the statutory device of postsale redemption: give the mortgagor a year 
to buy the property back from the foreclosure purchaser by tendering what the purchaser paid at 
the foreclosure sale. CCP §§726(e), 729.010–729.090. That way—so the thinking went—
potential bidders would be deterred from bidding too l w because the lower the bid, the greater 
the likelihood that the debtor would redeem, thereby destroying the bidder’s bargain. Thus, 
Justice Traynor opined that the primary purpose of the postsale redemption right is to force the 
purchaser “to bid the property in at a price approximating its fair value.” Salsbery v Ritter (1957) 
48 C2d 1, 11, 306 P2d 897. 
“[B]idders find in statutory redemption a disincentive to bid more, because it robs them for the 
next year of both possession of the property and certainty of ownership.” 
Like its predecessor idea of requiring a foreclosure sale instead of permitting strict foreclosure, 
however, this new right of redemption (commonly refe red to as “statutory redemption”) rarely 
does what it is supposed to do. Rather, bidders find in statutory redemption a disincentive to bid 
more, because it robs them for the next year of both p ssession of the property and certainty of 
ownership. Our courts now recognize statutory redemption as an influence that, rather than 
increasing prices, reduces them. 
Fair Market Value 
This observation leads us to a discussion of the next l gislative response to unfair 
“forfeitures”—fair market value. In many states, a deficiency judgment is not measured by the 
amount bid at the judicial foreclosure sale, but rather by the fair market value of the property. 
The new Restatement (Third) of Property (Mortgages) §8.4(d) (1997), thus provides: 
If it is determined that the fair market value is greater than the foreclosure sale price, the persons 
against whom recovery of the deficiency is sought are entitled to an offset against the deficiency 
in the amount by which the fair market value . . . exceeds the sale price. 
Accordingly, underbidding at the sale will not cause a double loss to the mortgagor. 
California goes even further. Code of Civil Procedure §726 adopts as the limiting standard for 
deficiencies the phrase “fair value,” rather than fir market value. Fair value was plainly intended 
to mean something different from fair market value because the statute was amended in 1937 to 
replace “fair market value” with “fair value.” 
San Paolo 
The reason for all this background is to lead up to the recent case of San Paolo U.S. Holding 
Co. v 816 S. Figueroa Co. (1998) 62 CA4th 1010, 73 CR2d 272, reported at p 107. That decision 
adopts a workable definition of fair value while realistically recognizing that postsale redemption 
has an “adverse impact” on bidding. San Paolo holds that fair value is the same as fair market 
value—i.e., what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller inan open market—except that fair 
value would not reflect the fact that the sale is aforeclosure sale subject to statutory redemption, 
with consequently lower bids. Thus, if the property would command $1 million on the open 
market, but foreclosure bidders are willing to bid only $900,000 (because of postsale 
redemption), the fair value of the property is $1 million, not $900,000. 
Lenders can certainly complain about the math; it probably assures mortgagees that they will 
suffer noncompensable losses in their deficiency judgments. If a court is to assume that 
redemption reduces prices, then any price bid at a redeemable foreclosure sale by definition must 
be below fair market value. In other words, the fair v lue must be higher than what was bid at the 
sale (and the deficiency judgment accordingly smaller). 
The mortgagee’s loss, however, may not be permanent. If the mortgagee is the winning bidder 
at the foreclosure sale, it can probably eliminate th  loss by reselling (in a truly open market 
transaction) a year later. Recapture of the spread b tween fair value and fair market value should 
further induce mortgagees not to let third parties outbid them in this underbidding context. 
San Paolo’s definition of fair value is also easy to work with: it is what a listing broker would 
say the property could be sold for, and appraisal testimony will be easy to produce. (“Fair market 
value on foreclosure,” on the other hand, would have been a much harder number to derive.) 
“San Paolo rejected a rival concept of fair value that could have meant disaster.” 
What Could Have Been 
Most importantly, San Paolo rejected a rival concept of fair value that could have meant 
disaster. The court could have defined fair value—as the North Dakota Supreme Court did in 
Schiele v First Nat’l Bank (ND 1989) 436 NW2d 248, 249—as the number that produces “a fair 
and equitable result between the parties.” In Californ a, Rainer Mortgage v Silverwood, Ltd. 
(1985) 163 CA3d 359, 209 CR 294, intimated such treatm nt by more or less equating fair value 
with intrinsic value. The consequences of that kind of interpretation were made obvious by the 
appraiser for the mortgagor in San Paolo, who, following Rainer’s line of reasoning, concluded 
that the security had a fair value of $5.1 million, even though the lender had acquired it for only 
$1.5 million at the foreclosure sale and had then resold it for $1 million to a third party. In the 
appraiser’s opinion, the current (1995) market value was irrelevant because the market was 
depressed, and the “intrinsic” or “inherent” value of the property was what it was worth during 
the years 1985–1989, when the market was not depressed, i.e., was “normal.” How would you 
like to be up against appraisal testimony like that? 
I recommend that lenders not be too upset that our existing fair-value test ignores the fact that 
postsale redemption hurts prices and charges lenders for it. Compared with what might have 
been, it is a small price to pay for the certainty of being able to use real values rather than 
impressions of what properties would be worth if only things were different from what they are. 
